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Judicial Independence in Administrative Adjudication:
Past, Present, and Future'
By Ann Marshall Young
"A fine mess you've gotten us into now!"
Oliver Hardy to Stan Laurel
First, it was ddjA vu all over again': Recently while researching
judicial independence in administrative adjudication, it dawned on me
afresh that the present contentiousness in some quarters over the proper
role of administrative law judges2 is really nothing new. Then, I had
one of Piaget's "Ah-Ha!" moments: As I read more about the history of
our unique calling, I realized there is a reason for the contortions we
administrative law judges seem continually to endure attempting to
fulfill our jobs - ethically - as neutral decision-makers.
Our problems have never been the result of mere mistake! The
ambiguities in administrative law that have caused untold thousands of
hair-pulling, gut-wrenching moments of frustration for untold numbers
of administrative law judges (and gotten us somewhat of a reputation
for airing our dirty laundry in public) were written into the law
intentionally! And my gut wrenched as I thought, Am I the only one who
didn't know all this???
*This paper is a slightly-revised version of an article originally printed in THE
JUDGEs' JOURNAL, Vol. 38, No. 3 at 16 (Summer 1999). Author Ann Marshall Young,
immediate past president of NAALJ, is an administrative law judge with the Tennessee
Department of State, Administrative Procedures Division. She is also a member of the
Executive Committee of the ABA National Conference of Administrative Law Judges
(NCALJ) and chair of the NCALJ Judicial Independence Committee. All opinions stated in this
article are her own and do not necessarily represent the views of her employer or of any other
persons or organizations.
AUTHOR'S NOTE: I would like to thank Professors Tim Terrell and George Shepherd (Emory
Law School), Tom McCoy (Vanderbilt Law School), and Mike Asimow (UCLA Law School)
for graciously sharing their time to read earlier drafts of this article and provide helpful
feedback. Any shortcomings in the article are, of course, my responsibility.
'Attributed to Lawrence "Yogi" Berra (who denied he ever said it, in his biography,
YOGI - IT AIN'T OVER..., by Yogi Berra with Tom Horton, 1989).
2The term administrative law judge is generally intended in this article to encompass
administrative judges, hearing examiners and other administrative adjudicators, whatever their
titles.
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OUR PAST: Difficult Times
It all began with the best of intentions. The rise of the
administrative state - the "fourth branch" of government - was the
result of sincere efforts to improve our world, in a variety of ways. With
the Depression and Roosevelt's New Deal, these efforts gained
momentum. The New Dealers who developed and implemented
administrative policy saw themselves as finding "good working
solutions to major social and economic problems," pragmatically, to
correct unfairness.3
However, according to Emory University Law Professor George
B. Shepherd, questions were raised from the start about the manner in
which the New Dealers went about improving the world, with some
asserting that the expert bureaucrats who claimed efficiency asjustification for their broad powers to influence "even the details of the
economy" were instead engaging in "dictatorial central planning,"
contrary to the rule of law.4
Many challengers were sincere in their resolve to foster agency
fairness to persons affected by governmental action. For there were
negative impacts, and little recourse for those without political power.
While many benefited, there was also pain.
Being from Tennessee I know of some of the benefits: the
Works Progress Administration (WPA) that built the State park where
I went swimming as a child; Eleanor Roosevelt's pet project, the
Subsistence Homestead Act, which provided many of my friends'
families with homes; and the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) that
gave us cheap power. But, being from Tennessee, I also know about
those whose homes and farms were taken and flooded to make the TVA
lakes and dams, with little due process. "Wild River" in 1960, with
Montgomery Clift, Jo Van Fleet and Lee Remick, directed by Elia
Kazan (always with administrative law there seem to be controversial
connections!), showed us the heartbreak that can occur on a human
level when progress comes to one's own neck of the woods.
3Martin Shapiro, APA: Past, Present, Future, 72 VA. L. REv. 447, 449 (1986).4George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act
Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 1557, 1559 (1996).
The Early Contenders in Administrative Law Reform
Although some were non-partisan in questioning the methods
used by New Deal administrative agencies, others (the greater number
according to Shepherd5) have been painted in a more self-interested
light - as political actors and interest groups with more substantive
disagreements with New Deal policies.6 The American Bar Association
(ABA), which became the leader of the effort to reform the
administrative state, has been included in this characterization - the
ABA of "elite lawyers" whose Big Business clients stood to lose in a
big way from some of the activities of the New Dealers, according to
some commentators.7
Opposed to the ABA were Roosevelt's people, including
eventually a committee formed by the Attorney General and staffed by
Columbia Law Professor Walter Gellhorn and Kenneth Culp Davis,
who both later became known as leading authorities on administrative
law. And they were hardly neutral themselves, Gellhorn having argued
that Congress should impose not more but less procedural formality on
agencies.'
What occurred in the years leading up to the 1946 enactment of
the federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA) was, according to
Shepherd, not the statesmanlike negotiation and harmonious conclusion
later portrayed by many on both sides. It was instead a "pitched battle
for the life of the New Deal,"9 and not a pretty sight. It included both
proponents and opponents of reform castigating each other as
communists and fascists, the administrative state as a totalitarian
"Frankenstein" peopled with "bureaucrats gone mad with power,"'
10
agencies as being comparable to the Gestapo," and ABA reformers as
51d.at 1569.
6 Shepherd notes that efforts to constrain agencies based more on substantive
disagreements than on concerns over procedural fairness came from both liberals and
conservatives, starting even prior to the New Deal. Id. at 1567.
71d. at 1560 et seq.; Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Legal Profession and the Development
ofAdministrative Law, 72 CHI. KENT L. REV. 1119 (1997).
'Shepherd, supra note 4, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. at 1598, quoting from Gellhorn,
FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 78-81 (1941).
9 Shepherd, Id. at 1560.
101d. at 1609.
"Id. at 1610.
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"hysterical"' 2 supporters of a "lawyers' emergency relief bill" 'that
would create "a judicial fascisti."' 4
This rancor, which Shepherd convincingly establishes through
meticulous examination of original source materials, resulted from
many factors, including the widespread uncertainty of the time, when
many believed that communism and fascism were actually possible in
this country." The very future of our nation and form of government
were considered to be at stake. 6 Political and economic issues
involving redistribution of wealth versus a laissez-faire business
atmosphere were of concern, as were questions of the allocation of
power between the branches of government. And for some, the pivotal
questions involved whether, how, and to what extent due process and
the rule of law would apply in the administrative state.
In short, many held strong views, had a lot at stake from many
perspectives, and were at odds on many issues.
Early Administrative Adjudicators and Judicial Independence
In the midst of this hostile combat over administrative reform,
the prototype for the modem-day administrative law judge was
conceived, later to be born in what Shepherd calls the "cease-fire
armistice"' 7 of the 1946 federal APA. The first Model State
Administrative Procedure Act was produced the same year.'8
Talk ofjudicial independence had come early in the fighting of
the previous two decades, with the initial proposals for reform indeed
focusing on the idea of an administrative court.'9 Sadly, all too often,
from the beginning, administrative law judges who have taken their
duty to be independent decision-makers seriously and presumed to act
"judicial" have been viewed negatively: if not as poor cousins of
indeterminate breeding who put on airs, then as undeserving pretenders
2Id. at 1596.
"Id. at 1613.
1Id. at 1614.
"Id. at 1559.
1Id. at 1606.
'
7Id. at 1560-61.
"
8Although State APA's vary widely, historically the scholarship and caselaw on
administrative law has tended to be based largely on the Federal APA, and the same issues
seem consistently to arise in all jurisdictions.
19Shepherd, supra note 4, 90 Nw. L. REV. at 1565, 1566.
to the coveted bench of the judicial branch, inclined to frustrate
agencies trying to implement important public policy. Walter Gellhorn
himself later complained of "'Hearing officers' . . . puffed up into
'Hearing Commissioners' and... later.., into Administrative law
judges who sometimes flaunt their robes a bit too obtrusively for my
taste." 20
Every administrative law judge (and they are legion) who has
ever heard the words "real judge" uttered to differentiate his or her
chaff from others' wheat recognizes this reticence to accord
unequivocal respect to our profession. And while we don't want to
seem defensive, I think this ambivalence should be recognized for what
it is, in the present colloquy about judicial independence, for several
reasons.
First, this barely acknowledged view of administrative law
judges seems, if subtly, often to serve as "permission" to be less
committed to the concept of judicial independence in the context of
administrative adjudication than with regard to the judicial branch.
Second, it not surprisingly creates a level of defensiveness in
administrative law judges, which in turn, as it is perceived by the rest
of the legal community, exacerbates the problem of lukewarm support
for judicial independence in administrative adjudication. Third, it is one
of the factors in discussions about judicial independence that often
cause the focus to shift from the public interest to the interests of
judges, when in truth, "independence is not for the personal benefit of
the judges but rather for the protection of the people, whose rights only
an independent judge can preserve. '"21
Finally, I think this equivocal approach to judicial independence
in administrative adjudication contains lessons with regard to the
discussion about judicial independence generally. For in those pitched
battles over administrative reform, the resentments spilled over as well
onto the judicial branch. In 1939, for example, Gellhorn expressed the
view that an ABA-sponsored reform bill would, in its judicial review
provisions, establish "judicial overlordship" and be an "arrogant
2
°Walter Gellhom, The Administrative Procedure Act: The Beginnings, 72 VA. L.
REV. 219, 232 (1986).21See An Independent Judiciary- Report of the Commission on Separation of Powers
and Judicial Independence, American Bar Association, July 4, 1997, at iii.
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assumption of power" by the judicial branch.22 In 1940, he said:
The judiciary has by myriad ways sought to foster the
illusion that it alone is capable of governing justly and
dispassionately, that the entrusting of responsibilities to
the administrative agencies is fraught with danger
unless their exercise is ultimately subject to judicial
supervision, and that the supremacy of law is
synonymous with the supremacy of the judges....
[The country should] carefully and constantly eschew
[the belief] that the capacity to govern justly lies only
beneath the black robes of the judges, and that to them,
the wise and good fathers, we must turn hopefully for
true guidance through the mazes of the law. That belief,
I submit, may do more than merely produce poor
government - it may also eventually produce chaos and
thus destroy faith in government itself.23
Gellhorn's more recent observation that "[j]udges are not alone in
knowing how to go about obtaining information and acting upon it
fairly,"24 reveals a fundamentally different world-view than that held by
most judges, for whom I suggest the major concern is not who acts, but
rather what the process is for resolving disputes not otherwise
successfully resolved.
Professor Richard Pierce further illustrates this philosophically
different "take" on judicial decision-making in an article in which he
22Shepherd, supra note 4, 90 Nw. L. REV. at 1597.231d. at 1597-98, quoting from Walter Gellhom, The Improvement of Public
Administration, in 2 NAT. LAW. GUILD Q. 20, 23 (1940). For a contrasting view of the role of
the judicial branch in reviewing agency interpretation of regulatory statutes, see Cynthia R.
Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 452 (1989).
It is noted that Gellhom's view of the dangers posed by judges is in stark contrast to those who
fear the ramifications of encroaching on judicial independence. One of the earliest of those to
warn that the then-"secret tendency to diminish the judicial power" in the United States would
"sooner or later be attended with fatal consequences" was Alexis De Tocqueville, who
predicted "that it will be found out at some future period that by ... lessening the
independence of the judiciary ... not only the judicial power, but the democratic republic
itself' would be harmed. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 1840, THE
HENRY REEVE TEXT, Part I, at 278. (Phillips Bradley ed., Alfred A. Knopf, 1945).24Gellhorn, supra note 20, 72 Va. L. Rev. at 232.
supports the Social Security Administration's efforts in the 1980s to
mandate the proportions of administrative law judge decisions granting
and denying benefits, and implicitly challenges the concepts of due
process and the rule of law:
Judges control the judicial decisionmaking process. The
identification of weaknesses in that process, or alternatives
that perform better in some contexts, threatens their self-
image. Many are unwilling to admit that, in some contexts,
judicial decisionmaking is absurdly expensive, highly
subjective, and rife with inconsistency. Moreover, initiatives
like the SSA's efforts to control the conduct of its
Administrative law judges strike far too close to federal
judges' own turf. What if some institution actually began to
monitor the productivity and inter-judge consistency of the
federal bench? What if such an investigation detected major
differences in productivity and large inconsistencies in
outcomes? If the SSA can exercise control over the
productivity and consistency of its Administrative law judges,
perhaps some institution has the power to exercise analogous
control over federal judges. In short, federal judges are biased
decisionmakers when they draw lines between permissible
political control of agency policymaking and impermissible
bias in agency decisionmaking."
Whether these examples are of a piece with the hostility against
judges and judicial independence addressed by Penny J. White in her
article in this issue [of the Judges Journal, i.e. vol. 38, No. 3 at 4], they
seem significant, coming as they do from respected members of the
academic community. They illustrate the pervasiveness of anti-judge
sentiment, whatever its source and however civilized it is. And if "real"
judges have been deemed appropriate targets of resentment, then the
unfortunate administrative law judge, born out of strife and wrenched
from both sides in the battles over administrative reform that have
continued since then, has hardly stood a chance of escaping unscathed.
25Richard Pierce, Political Control Versus Impermissible Bias in Agency
Decisionmaking: Lessons from Chevron and Mistretta, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 481,486 (1990); see
also Kenneth Culp Davis and Richard J. Pierce, Jr., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, 3d. Ed.,
§9.10, at 103.
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Then, as now, administrative law has been a subject of controversy, and
administrative law judges and the issue of judicial independence are
often at the center of it. As White proposes, such matters must be
addressed by first learning about the source of problems.26
The APA - A Bitter Compromise
According to Shepherd, the 1946 Federal APA was a "bitter
compromise of [a] fierce political battle"" largely won by the
Roosevelt administration, whose interpretations have prevailed,
providing "agencies with broad freedom, limited only by relatively
weak procedural requirements."2 Professor Martin Shapiro agrees that
the New Dealers largely won the battle, observing that the compromise
"engenders the basic tensions that plague administrative law today."'2 9
The act contained many parts that were intentionially ambiguous
(and have been modified only to a minor extent since 19463"). The
parties were unable to reach agreement on any specific, clear provisions
that would have resolved the'ambiguity,3' and continued to disagree
after passage. Among agencies it was said that "there is practically
universal opinion that the bill, if actually enforced, will wreck federal
administration."32 On the other side, as one overly optimistic
congressman commented, "I am hopeful that the Committee on the
Judiciary within a short time will bring in a much broader bill that will
guarantee real justice to all the people, and assure that justice will be
done in all proceedings, that whether a man be poor or rich, equal
justice will be meted out."33
And yet, in 1986, Gellhom and Davis characterized the APA as
"obvious triumph of truth over ignorance" and opposition to the New
26Sec Penny J. White, Judicial Independence: Second Steps, 38 JUDGES' JOURNAL
No. 3, at 4 (Summer 1999).
27Shepherd, supra note 4, 90 Nw. L. REv. at 1681.2ald. at 1682, 1559.29Shapiro, supra note 3 at 453.
3 See Shepherd, supra note 4, 90 Nw. L. REv. at 1558; see also Shapiro, supra note
3 at 448.
311d. at 1665.
321d. at 1674, citing Frederick F. Blachly & Miriam E. Oatman, Sabotage of the
Administrative Process, 6 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 213, 226-27, n.l (1946).33Shepherd, supra note 4, 90 Nw. L. REv. at 1671-72, citing Rep. Sabath in 1946.
Deal as "hysterical."34 Shepherd notes the tendency they and others
have had to transform principled disagreement with the New Deal into
"silly rantings," observing that the "New Deal victors belittled their
slain conservative foes, although conservatives fought bravely and
fairly."35
The context for the APA's passage, after years of fighting, was an
atmosphere perhaps of battle fatigue. Since 1937 there had been
wrangling and stalemate, in which conservatives could defeat liberal
proposals but Roosevelt could successfully veto conservative
initiatives.3 6 Then there was the real war, during which both sides of the
reform debate agreed to postpone the ultimate fight in order to support
the war effort.
In the end, the bill that led to the APA was produced and refined not
through public debate in Congress, but through private, off-the-record
negotiations. Thus there was no legislative history in the ordinary sense.
Instead, interested parties attempted to create legislative history that
would favor their respective points of view by writing reports and
introducing them into the Congressional record, hoping that future
courts would rely on them in interpreting the Act.3" Shepherd
characterizes what occurred in the following way:
Instead of agreeing on specific provisions, the parties agreed to
a game of roulette in which the courts spun the wheel. The
roulette wheel insulated the parties from their constitutents' ire.
If a party lost the statutory roulette, the party could assert to
constituents that the party had bargained hard and achieved the
constituents' goals. The party could blame the unfavorable
outcome on loose-cannon, activist courts.3"
Thus the seeds for whatever controversy and confusion presently
exist among those interested in administrative law were sown at the
341d. at 1560, 1682, citing Kenneth C. Davis & Walter Gellhorn, Present at the
Creation: Regulatory Reform Before 1946,38 ADMIN. L. REv. 511, 514-15 (1986). Shepherd
notes also, at 1596, that Davis, in his ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 29 (1958), speaks with
pride of the work of the Attorney General's committee, nowhere mentioning his own role in
the committee.
3"Shepherd, supra note 4, 90 Nw. L. REv. at 1682.
36Id. at 1675.
"Id. at 1662-65.381d. at 1665.
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birth of the modem administrative state, in an atmosphere of acrimony.
And the subject ofjudicial independence per se is likewise fraught with
acrimony. However, although these realities present definite challenges,
our future may be different, if those among the administrative law
community who view administrative lawjudges as somehow having the
responsibility of advancing agency agendas, on the one hand, and those
administrative law judges and others who support strong requirements
and protections of independent decision-making, on the other (and all
those in between), can learn to communicate more effectively with each
other. For, simplistic though it may seem, perhaps it is possible that, as
the warden in "Cool Hand Luke" observed, part of what we may have
here is "a failure to communicate."
OUR PRESENT: Progress Through Better Communication
When I was fortunate enough to travel to China last year with a
group of women judges, I learned much about communication. My
primary focus in our meetings with women judges there was on
discerning how independent they are as judges.39 I saw parallels
between their judicial system, which is highly bureaucratized with
multiple levels of supervision, and parts of our administrative
adjudicatory system. I learned, for example, that their exparte rule is
limited to communications with parties, and allows, as some
administrative adjudication offices here allow, ex parte
communications from persons other than parties (such as supervisors
or governmental officials) - a clear route to potential inappropriate
influence.
I also learned from my Chinese friends how important "face" can
be in communicating. I perceived that whenever they perceived that any
of the Americans were telling them what to do, they instinctively drew
back, even if the signs of it were barely visible. But when we were able
to establish ties of identification and friendship with each other, we
were able to talk fairly directly about serious issues. This lesson from
their wisdom may assist us in better communicating with each other on
historically difficult issues of independence in administrative
adjudication.
39 See Ann Marshall Young, Not So Far Away: Visiting with Women Judges in China,
38 JUDGES' JOURNAL No. 1, at 44 (Winter 1999).
Progress has been made on this front. The ABA Section of
Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice, whose membership
includes many from the academic and agency communities, and the
National Conference of Administrative Law Judges (NCALJ) have co-
sponsored several programs featuring discussion of judicial
independence issues, including one in February 1997 on the ABA
Model Act Creating a State Central Hearing Agency, and one in
January 1998 on health law issues, with a segment on judicial
independence in administrative adjudication. Also, in October 1998, the
administrative law section held a telephone call-in CLE program on
administrative law, which included a lively discussion on the
independence of administrative law judges. Additional cooperative
programs on the state central panel concept and on the future of the
APA, including a segment on an independent judiciary, are planned for
this summer's Annual Meeting and for a joint administrative
law/NCALJ meeting this October. The ABA Special Committee on
Judicial Independence is also co-sponsoring an Annual Meeting
program in Atlanta with NCALJ, Judicial Independence in
Administrative Adjudication: Right or Duty?
These cooperative efforts, along with growing professional and
personal interaction among the two communities, bode well for a
possible rapprochement that is less a compromising of deeply-held
values than a realization that our interests lie closer together than we
previously imagined.
Understanding the Sources of Our Differences
To achieve better communication and understanding between us, I
suggest we first closely examine the sources of our differences, in order
to define the issues more precisely. Then, by considering these issues
in a practical, real-world context, at the level of what actually occurs in
different types of cases, we can better determine whether our interests
may in fact coincide - much as parties in mediation are encouraged to
approach each other not from the standpoint of "positions," but from
the starting point of practical interests. What is it that you and I want to
achieve? Is it possible that some of our separate interests overlap with
each other? And how, practically speaking, can we both fulfill as much
40See Menu for Success, 84 ABA JOURNAL (October 1998) 48.
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as possible of what we want to achieve, without compromising vital
interests?
Observation suggests the root of much communication difficulty in
the administrative law community is a fundamental difference in world
views. Just as it has been shown that one's personality type can
influence one's judging,4 there seem to be basic differences in
philosophy among the players in the continuing struggles over
administrative adjudication - not only on complex legal issues but also
on such elemental issues as how people operate and what motivates
them in their actions, and on the nature of power and how it plays into
the equation. We speak in different languages, but often don't realize
it, and therefore don't make the special effort necessary to understand
each other. In China I had the benefit of a talented translator secure
enough to ask questions and discuss points when uncertain of particular
meanings, and persistent enough to struggle to find accurate
translations. We must do this for ourselves.
One area of difference is over the value of the litigation process as
a means of deciding important issues. Some place more importance on
the rights-protection aspects of this last-resort means of resolving
disputes, developed over centuries through the common law. Others
prefer a more bureaucratic model that allows for greater discretion,
without the restraints inherent in litigation with judicial review - and
greater ability to control the actions of administrative law judges.
Another difference is between a belief that human beings require
continuing oversight, evaluation, and supervision in order to perform
their duties well,42 and the view that any adjudicator held out to be
neutral and impartial must operate from a position of autonomy. It is
argued at times that the former model, although it limits independence,
provides for desired and necessary accountability. In the latter model,
there can be accountability in the sense that incompetent work or
misconduct may lead to reprimand, discipline or even removal, but one
is responsible for performing well on one's own on a day-to-day basis,
without ongoing supervision and evaluation; thus there is more
41John W. Kennedy, Jr., Personality Type andJudicial Decision Making, 37 JUDGEs'
JOURNAL No. 3, at 5 (Summer 1998).42See text accompanying note 25 above.
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independence.43
There are also differences over what the true effects of continuing
oversight, evaluation, and supervision are. Do they truly serve to
improve performance, or can they instead compromise not only quality
of performance but also independent thinking, as research by some
behavioral economists has shown44? Such issues obviously have
relevance in a judicial context, in which independent decision-making
is a positive value, tied closely to the concept of judicial impartiality,
so much so for some as to essentially equate the two.45
And yet, to those who are not so enthusiastic about the concept of
judicial independence, particularly with regard to administrative law
judges, such independence and the procedural protections that foster it
can impede the government in achieving positive progress, by setting
up hoops and roadblocks that seem to bear little relationship to
substantive goals. Control also appears to be an issue. And all these
issues are related to the little matter of ego. Ego, as in "black robe
fever" for one side of the argument, and as in a "need to control," on the
other side.
The Rule of Law, Due Process, and Ex Parte Communications
Another area of confusion and differing viewpoints has to do with
the meaning of the rule of law and procedural due process. 46 1 suggest
that the rule of law, defined by Black's Law Dictionary as providing
"that decisions should be made by the application of known principles
or laws without the intervention of discretion in their application, '47
encompasses two cardinal legal concepts:
43See Ann Marshall Young, Evaluation ofAdministrative Law Judges: Premises,
Means, and Ends, XVII J. NAALJ I (Spring 1997); Edwin L. Felter, Jr., Maintaining the
Balance Between Judicial Independence and Accountability in Administrative Law, 38
JUDGES' JOURNAL 22, 54 (Winter, 1997).
"See Young, supra note 43, especially at 33 et seq.45For example, in the Tennessee Bar Association's campaign against efforts to oust
judges viewed by some as "soft on crime," the word "impartiality" was consciously used
instead "independence," as the latter was viewed by some as being too controversial.
"6See, for example, Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory
Independence and the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L. J. 455, 494 (1986); and
Cynthia R. Farina, Conceiving Due Process, 3 YALE. J. OF LAW & FEMINISM 189 (1991), for
two contrasting views on the subject.
47BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, Sixth Edition 1990, at 1332.
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(A) The due process concept of "notice," which provides that
persons should be judged based only on information of which
they are adequately made aware and to which they are given
meaningful opportunity to respond; and
(B) The concept of "equal justice under the law," which
provides that discretion injudging should be minimized in favor
of neutral, across-the-board application of laws and rules under
which similarly situated persons are treated similarly, without
regard to characteristics such as race, national origin, etc.
From a pragmatic standpoint, neither of these principles can be
effectively fulfilled without also fulfilling the other: Notice and
opportunity to respond mean little if a judge is biased, and decision-
making cannot be truly unbiased without giving parties notice of all
information and factors on which a decision is to be based, and
meaningful opportunity to respond and be heard. Absent such notice
and opportunity to respond, a judge may easily be biased in favor of
behind-the-scenes experts and advisors, without the countervailing
effect of a response to advice that may contain implicit, but
unrecognized, value judgments.48 Codes of judicial conduct, including
the 1990 ABA Model Code, address both issues in various provisions.
To prevent administrative law judges from being influenced by
factors not known by parties, all codes of conduct and all administrative
procedure acts contain provisions relating to exparte communications.
Such provisions prohibit judges, with certain narrow exceptions, from
participating in any communications or receipt of information about a
case outside the presence of all parties.
And yet, some do not go along with the exparte prohibitions in all
particulars, arguing among other things that administrative decision-
makers need the flexibility to consult privately with their own experts,
and that it is appropriate for supervising judges, and even agency
supervisors, to oversee the work of administrative law judges on an ex
48See Cass R. Sunstein, Factions, Self-Interest, and the APA: Four Lessons Since 1946,
72 VA. L. REv. 271, 281 (1986), in which the possibility of value judgments entering into
expert advice when statutes leave room for interpretation, and the need to disclose such advice
and subject it to scrutiny and review, are discussed.
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parte basis.49 Those who advocate such oversight include some who
believe that administrative law judges are in effect extensions of
agencies responsible for implementing agency policy, and therefore, not
only should agency personnel have the flexibility to influence their
decisions, but also that administrative law judges should be biased in
favor of agency points of view.
Others believe that any taint of improper influence is removed if it
is a chief or supervising judge who initiates ex parte communication
with subordinate judges, for example, to control quality of work.
However, it has been noted that such a bureaucratic judicial model can
limit judicial autonomy as compared to non-hierarchical judicial models
that enhance autonomy, and that inappropriate exercise of power by
superior members of a judicial bureaucracy has often been a feature of
authoritarian regimes.5"
Finding Interests in Common
Some of the above differences are chasms apart, and may be
difficult to bridge. However, at a minimum I suggest they need to be
articulated in plain terms, in the clear light of day, where they can be
examined openly and straightforwardly. Once these fundamental world-
view issues are out in the open, it may be possible, by hypothetical
consideration of them using real-world examples, to discern new
patterns and consider new ways of looking at things. And by putting
oneself in the position of an other - litigant, advocate, administrator,
judge or professor - one may truly, perhaps for the first time clearly,
see the impact of one's own view of things.5
Due to space considerations, I will discuss only a couple of
examples, on subjects that seem to be particular "sticking points" in
administrative law. First, both past and present commentators have
49One who argued vociferously against the exparte prohibitions in the original APA,
calling it an "extreme provision," was Kenneth Culp Davis. See I ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE, 2d Ed., § 1.8, at 27-28.
50See Donald W. Jackson, Judicial Independence in Cross-National Perspective,
ABA Div. for Pub. Educ. Teaching Resource Bulletin No. 6, JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE -
ESSAYS, BIBLIOGRAPHY, AND DISCUSSION GUIDE, at 8 et seq.
5'One might refer to this as applying the "Golden Rule" to law. For a more
sophisticated discussion of how personal values can affect judging, see Paul L. Biderman, Of
Vulcans and Values: Judicial Decision-Making and Implications for Judicial Education, 47
Juv. & FAM. CT. J 61 (1996).
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observed that although some kinds of administrative adjudication,
involving accusatory allegations of wrongdoing that require fact-
intensive decisions, are appropriate for application of strict exparte and
exclusive record rules, others are not. 2 The latter involve
environmental regulation, various forms of rate-making, and other areas
involving a need for agency expertise, and possible public participation.
UCLA Law Professor Michael Asimow argues among other things that
strict rules in these cases inhibit candid and much-needed advice from
experts and cause substantial delay, and recommends a different model
for "nonaccusatory" adjudication. 3
It has also been argued that such strict rules should not be
applied to procedural matters such as continuances,54 in contrast to
ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3B(7), which directs one
to whether a communication would give a party a procedural or tactical
advantage, and requires disclosure." Others disagree with less stringent
application of the exparte requirements in these situations, advocating
consistent adherence to the canon, based on due process considerations,
judicial independence, perceptions of fairness, and avoidance of the
negative effects of less than as-open-as-possible government.
I suggest, the practical concerns of agencies can be
accommodated, while at the same time complying strictly with the
canon and protecting parties' due process interests, judicial
independence, public perceptions of fairness, and open government.
These concerns can all be addressed through such available means as
protective orders, limited intervention, concentration on narrowing
issues pre-hearing, expedited discovery, improved conflict
management, expanded availability of voluntary mediation, ex parte
52See Michael Asimow, When the Curtain Falls: Separaiion of Functions in the
FederalAdministrative Agencies, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 759, 779 etseq., 788 etseq. (1981); John
Foster Dulles, The Effect in Practice of the Report on Administrative Procedure, 41 COLUM.
L. REV. 617, 621 (1941).
53Asimow, supra note 52 at 794-797.
'Such arguments were made in the negotiations leading up to the final draft of the
ABA Model Act Creating a State Central Hearing Agency, adopted February 3, 1997; in the
end, the subject was not addressed and the issue was left to be resolved according to existing
or future state provisions on exparte communications.
55See Jeffrey M. Shaman, Steven Lubet, and James J. Alfini, JuDIcIAL CONDUCT AND
ETHIcs, Ch. 5 (2nd Ed. 1995). For Shaman et al it is implicit that administrative law judges
are subject to the same ethical requirements as judicial branch judges. See, e.g., §4.25 at 144.
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handling of appropriate scheduling and administrative matters followed
by disclosure as required by Canon 3B(7), and others. We have much
work to do, but there are a multitude of flexible options for addressing
practical concerns within an enlightened view of the litigation process,
which protect the rights of parties and the public interest.
Proposed Definitions of Judicial Independence for Administrative
Law Judges
On the subject of judicial independence, which weaves through
all the issues and problems discussed above, I offer as a starting point
some definitions, as much controversy may result from frequent use of
the term without any explicit definition of what it means. This may be
especially true with the administrative judiciary, whose unfortunate
omission from much of the discussion about judicial independence may
be due not only to general unfamiliarity with administrative law and
adjudication among the larger legal community, but also to confusion
over what judicial independence means in this context.
Traditionally, the concept is seen as including both decisional
independence, which refers to the independence of individual judges
"to perform the judicial function subject to no authority but the law,
[with the protection of] job tenure, adequate compensation and
security"; and institutional or branch independence, which refers to the
independence of the judicial branch as a separate branch of
government 56
Administrative law judges obviously do not have branch
independence. However, if the public is to be assured of optimally
neutral, impartial, and fair decisions in administrative adjudication, it
is necessary that administrative law judges have decisional
independence. Moreover, there are other means of providing a measure
of institutional independence with regard to administrative
adjudication: about half the states have established "central panels" of
administrative law judges who are separated from the agencies for
whom they conduct hearings," and in the past there have been efforts
56Id.
57Although such entities generally provide for greater independence from
inappropriate agency influence, how they are structured and managed is critical to avoiding the
potential for more concentrated inappropriate pressures that were previously spread among
multiple offices serving various agencies. See the ABA Model Act, supra note 54, for an
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to establish a similar corps of federal administrative law judges.
Decisional independence has two aspects: one more internal,
relating to how an individual chooses to function as a judge, and one
more external, having to do with practical circumstances that may
enhance or constrain independent and impartial judicial functioning.
I propose the term functional decisional independence to refer
to the way an administrative law judge performs the adjudicatory
function (judging) on a day-to-day basis. Ethical rules require judges to
perform this function in a manner that is neutral, impartial, and
independent of inappropriate influences. Administrative law judges
must be governed by no-less-stringent ethical rules than those
governing judicial branch judges, if they are to be held out and expected
to perform as truly neutral, impartial decision-makers, in the public
interest.
I propose the term practical decisional independence to refer to the
institutional structures and management practices relating to job status
and security that insulate administrative law judges from inappropriate
influences and thereby encourage them to function independently and
impartially. In order to achieve this effectively, the job must be viewed
as a judicial rather than a bureaucratic position; judges must be
selected, disciplined and removed according to standards and
procedures that ensure competence and protect due process; and their
working conditions, continuing education, and job status must enhance
rather than impede autonomy and independence.
OUR FUTURE...
In this day of public questioning of all things legal, it behooves all
of us in the legal arena to work together to revitalize public confidence
in the law, for our common future in the new millennium. To omit
administrative adjudication from this endeavor would be to ignore large
numbers of the public58 whose views of the legal system are, and will
example of how to structure such an office.
58According to Oregon Supreme Court Justice W. Michael Gillette, in a speech given
at the 1998 Annual Meeting of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges,
administrative law judges hear more cases per year than all Federal and all State judicial branch
judges combined.
continue to be, informed by its effects.59 Unless we ensure the public
truly impartial and independent decision-making in administrative
adjudication, from both a functional and practical standpoint, we are
excluding many from the promise of neutrality in our system of law,
and inviting their cynicism and resentment.
Administrative adjudication offers unique benefits, including
less formality, more flexibility, and the resulting ability to achieve more
timely and efficient resolution of cases. These benefits will be
enhanced, and the public interest better served, by requiring
administrative law judges to function as truly impartial, independent
decision-makers as a professional and ethical responsibility, and by
ensuring this through appropriate practical institutional structures and
management practices.
Progress is being made. We are beginning to learn each other's
languages. We need to continue to talk, and to listen. Perhaps, instead
of the "fine mess" we have sometimes found ourselves in, a new dawn
is breaking in the world of administrative adjudication - in which
judicial independence comes to be widely accepted, not as a matter of
power and ego, but as a fundamental duty and prerequisite to fair and
effective decision-making.
59See Cynthia R. Farina, The Consent of the Governed: Against Simple Rules for a
Complex World, 72 CHI. KENT L. REV. 987, 1028-29 (1997), and sources cited therein, on
psychologists' suggestions that public respect for government and the law depends as much
or more on how fair the process is as on substantive outcomes.
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